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SABinE Dullin
HoW to WAGE WARFARE  
WitHout GoinG to WAR?
Stalin’s 1939 war in the light  
of other contemporary aggressions*
three events took place on the western borders of the uSSR in 19391. At the time, 
they were described respectively as an invasion in the case of eastern Poland, a 
war in the case of Finland, and a military occupation in the case of the Baltic 
states, later becoming territorial annexations. Oficial Soviet rhetoric – widely 
adopted in updated form in modern-day Russia – justiied the three events as the 
accomplishment of the ukrainian, Belarusian, and lithuanian national projects, 
together with the necessary revision of the treaty of Riga, support for Communist 
Finland to ensure the safety of leningrad, and the joint defence of the Baltic 
coastline by Soviet and Baltic troops. Many historians, while not espousing the 
latter view, point to the polysemy of the events of autumn 1939: their outcome 
could not be foreseen by the Polish border guards taken unawares by the arrival of 
1. See M.i. Meltiukhov, upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor´ba za Evropu 
1939-1941 gg. (M.: Veche, 2002); Alfred Erich Senn, lithuania 1940: Revolution from Above (Amsterdam – New York: Rodopi, 2007); Sławomir Dębski, Między Berlinem a Moskzą, 
Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939-1941 (Warsaw: Polski instytut Spraw Międzynarodozych, 
2007). the Winter War has proved of considerable interest to Russian and Finnish historians, 
who have studied the event from a diplomatic and military perspective in a number of joint 
publications. the leading experts in the field contributed to the collection of essays Zimniaia 
Voina 1939-1940: Politicheskaia istoriia, o. Rzheshevskii, o. Vekhvilainen, eds. (M.: nauka, 
1999), with essays by the Russian historians V. Baryshnikov and o. Rzheshevskii and the 
Finnish scholars t. Vikhavainen and o. Manninen. the same cannot be said for the history of 
the occupation of the Baltic states, where there is still too much conflict at national level for 
a shared historiography to have emerged, except in lithuania: see Arvydas Anusauskas and 
Ceslovas laurinavicius, lietuva antrajame pasauliniame kare (Vilnius, 2007).
Cahiers du Monde russe, 52/2-3, Avril-septembre 2011, p. 221-243.
* A shorter version of this paper was presented at the conference “the uSSR and World 
War ii” in Paris, May 2011. My thanks to Silvio Pons and Sergei Slutch and to the audience for their stimulating questions and remarks. Thanks also to Sophie Cœuré and the two anonymous 
readers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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the Red Army, nor by the Baltic leaders who were hoping that bowing to Moscow’s 
ultimatums would ensure their independence, let alone by the Western powers keen 
to drive a wedge between Stalin and Hitler.
Western historiography often chooses to approach the annexations of 1939-40 
by considering them as the matrix for how the territories were organised in the 
post-war period2 and as signs indicating the re-inscription of Stalinist policy in 
the long view of the history of the Russian power and its geo-political dimension. 
Historians of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact still debate the extent to which Stalin 
saw it as a defensive policy: was the aim to delay war in the east once Poland had 
refused to allow the Red Army to pass through the country against a backdrop of 
deep Russian suspicion of the West’s intentions, or was it a strategy to exhaust 
Europe’s imperialist powers, paving the way for the Socialist revolution?
My own approach differs somewhat. I begin by asking two questions: Why did 
the uSSR not become involved in the Second World War from autumn 1939, while 
waging its own wars? Why did France and Britain not declare war on the Soviets 
when the Red Army crossed the Polish border? the answers lie in breaking down 
the barriers between diplomatic and military histories of the uSSR and reading 
Stalin’s discourse and practices in autumn 1939 in the wider European context of 
external policies of intervention and aggression. My initial hypothesis posits the 
existence of a repertoire and interpretative frameworks that could be described as 
transnational insofar as they were widely shared and used among leaders of the 
time – politicians and experts in international relations. the Soviet leaders and 
their European counterparts each had their own cultural and political references 
and their own particular approaches to national interest: however, they were also 
deeply involved in the problematics that had arisen from aggression, appeasement, 
and collective security since the previous war, particularly in terms of practices 
that were in line with or against league of nations policy. Furthermore, the legal 
debate over “crimes against peace” that was later to take place in nuremberg drew on 
arguments developed in the late 1930s, particularly by Soviet legal scholars.3 though 
the league of nations had lurched from one failure to another from the mid-1930s on, 
it still remained the key reference for public opinion in 1939, particularly in Europe.
I think it is important in explaining the signiicance of the moment of 19394 in the 
history of international relations not to draw on hindsight in judging the failure of 
the league of nations, the pact, the division of Poland and the Winter War: rather, 
historians should stick to what was known, or believed, at the time about events not 
2. on 16 December 1941, Stalin told Anthony Eden that the Soviet union insisted on recognition 
of its 1941 frontiers: see the transcript of the first talks between Stalin and Eden, 16 December 
1941, in o. Rzheshevskii, Stalin i Cherchill: Vstrechi, besedy, diskussii: Dokumenty, 
kommentarii, 1941-1945 (M.: nauka, 2004), 39.
3. Francine Hirsch, “the Soviets at nuremberg: international law, Propaganda, and the 
Making of the Postwar order,” American Historical Review, 113, 3 (june 2008): 701-730.
4. on the concept of “moment,” see Sebastian Conrad, Dominic Sachsenmaier, eds., Competing 
Visions of  World order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880- 1930s (new  York: Palgrave 
Macmillan,  2007).
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only in Washington, Paris, london, Geneva, and Moscow, but also in Warsaw, Riga, 
tallinn, and Helsinki. this means working with the uncertainties and hesitations of 
the time, even in instances whose outcome now seems as tragically inevitable as the 
disappearance of Poland and the incorporation of the Baltic states.
the displays of force of 1939 offer a way in to how people thought at the time 
about international policies of aggression, particularly those of the nazis and the 
Soviets, and the rhetoric used to dress them up and justify them. The irst part of 
the present article notes the emergence at the time of new ways of thinking about 
similarities between the external policies of totalitarian states. However, this is not 
to invalidate the two major contradictory readings of Soviet aggression, in terms of 
Realpolitik and Might on the one hand and revolutionary speciicity on the other. 
the second part of the article draws on a series of experiences to demonstrate the 
existence of an international repertoire in law and in practice in terms of aggression, 
conlict, and conlict resolution, as well as the tendency to localise and subdivide 
conlicts and the manner in which the Soviets engaged in such issues and the stance 
they took. this in turn sheds light on the third part of the article, which explores 
the rhetoric and justiications used by the Soviets when they entered Poland, sought 
guarantees in the Baltic states, and attacked Finland. What explanation can there 
be for the different European reactions to Soviet attacks on Poland, then Finland? 
The Soviet justiications, drawing on the common stock of international law and 
earlier experiences, may not have been morally acceptable, but they were politically 
comprehensible given the context. they did not break with earlier experiences. 
Rather, the shift came with the attack on Finland, when the revolutionary dimension 
of Soviet discourse meant that the discourse itself became unacceptable. 
the article draws on material from a number of sources. these include diplomatic 
archives, the archives at the Academy of Sciences and the Ministries for internal 
Affairs and State Security, and other publications and press material on the Soviet 
side, and archives at the league of nations, the international Anti-Communist 
Entente, French and British diplomatic documents and diplomatic memoranda, 
press material, and articles and debates on totalitarianism from Western Europe and 
the united States.5
Was an anti-totalitarian war a possibility in autumn 1939? 
intellectual and political obstacles
1939-1940 was a key moment in thinking on totalitarianism and its application in 
external policy. While the irst such analyses date from the 1930s, those developed 
at the outbreak of the war in Poland focused on the use of force and aggression 
in totalitarian policies and raised the issue of the German-Soviet alliance of 
5. the issue of reading Soviet policy in the wider European context is more fully explored 
in my forthcoming book L’URSS à la frontière (1920-1940): Le politique, l’imaginaire et le quotidien d’un État neuf (P.: Éditions de l’EHESS). 
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September 1939.6 the twofold shock felt by many intellectuals and activists at 
the USSR’s rejection of the anti-fascist alliance and abandonment of paciism led 
them to explore the question of what makes an external policy totalitarian. The irst 
university conference devoted to analysing the nature of totalitarianism was held 
in Philadelphia on november 17, 1939.7 Carlton Hayes, an eminent professor of 
European history at Columbia and a leading American advocate for the league 
of Nations whose thinking was inluenced by Catholicism, spoke on “The Novelty 
of totalitarianism in the History of Western Civilization.”8 He began by referring 
to the possibility of convergence underlying the peculiarities of mythology – a term 
he was one of the earliest to use in this sense: “Recent events have disclosed, 
nevertheless, that peculiarities of mythology are not necessarily divisive when it 
comes to arranging for a partition of foreign-mission ields.” He then underlined 
the similarities of methods and techniques, acting “behind a mask of plebiscites.” 
He concluded that the novelty of totalitarianism was its “Force against Czechs and 
Albanians, Poles and Finns!” and “an utter denial of any moral law superior to the 
might of dictators” in internal and external policy alike. 
Another speaker was Hans kohn, a historian of contemporary nationalism who 
had studied at the German university in Prague before taking up the Zionist cause 
in Palestine in 1923, eventually breaking with it and moving to the united States 
to teach history in 1933. kohn’s paper “the totalitarian Philosophy of War” made 
a clear distinction between fascist states and the uSSR, arguing that warfare was 
not a key driving force for the latter. quoting Mussolini (“War is to the man what 
maternity is to the woman. i do not believe in perpetual peace; not only do i not 
believe in it, but I ind it depressing and a negation of all the fundamental virtues 
of man”), he rather described fascist states as those that feed on war, setting their 
adversaries up as “total enemies,” turning heroism, sacriice and risk into norms for 
everyday life, and making extreme situations the normal political rule. However, 
his description and analysis of the nazi volte-face at the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
could equally apply to the USSR’s own brand of totalitarianism, which likewise cut 
its policies to it the circumstances: 
This lexibility allows the substitution of one enemy for the other most abruptly 
and enables the leader to direct the almost mystical totalitarian hatred of his 
6. See Enzo traverso’s anthology le totalitarisme: le xxe siècle en débat (P.: Éditions du Seuil, 
2001). For a distanced historical view of totalitarianism as a concept, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, 
Michael Geyer, eds., Beyond totalitarianism: Stalinism and nazism compared (new York: 
Cambridge university Press, 2009). 
7. the results were published as Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 82, 1 
(February 1940).
8. Hayes was one of the American experts to take part in drawing up the principles of the league 
of nations. He was also a member of the advisory committee of historians working to publish 
documents recording American participation in the fighting in France. He was uS ambassador 
to Spain from 1942 to 1944 and is held to have played a role in maintaining Franco’s neutrality. 
He became the first Catholic president of the American Historical Association in 1945. 
His works include the Historical Evolution of Modern nationalism (1931) and A Political and 
Cultural History of Modern Europe (Macmillan, 2 vols. 1932-36, rev. ed. 1939).
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followers against the most diverse objects. that explains the startling change in 
the attitude of the leader of the anti-comintern pact towards communism and the 
Soviet union after August 1939.
the Austrian historian and sociologist Franz Borkenau, himself a former Communist, 
published the totalitarian Enemy on December 1, 1939 (london, Faber & Faber, 
1940), writing the work after the shock of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 
start of the war when “one of the big surprises of this war [was] to witness Russia, 
‘the fatherland of all the toilers,’ in the role of a military conqueror.” For Borkenau, 
the pact clariied the situation and the parties present brought out the underlying 
similarities between the German and Russian systems, which he described as 
“Brown Bolshevism” and “Red Fascism,” thereby increasing the war’s legitimacy in 
defending freedom. Borkenau challenged the old label of economic imperialism and 
underlined the political aspect of such expansionism. He did acknowledge a degree 
of rationality on the Soviet side, noting their nationalist and strategic objectives: 
however, he held that the key aspect in both cases was that the will to conquer hid the 
desire to foment totalitarian revolution in the name of a higher historical necessity.
the notion of convergence re-launched by the pact was also widely held by 
trotskyites9, as totalitarianism was at the heart of their thought. on September 
18 – the day after the Red Army crossed into Poland – trotsky himself discussed 
Stalin’s propensity for organising referenda for national minorities, following the 
Goebbels model. trotsky was one of the few observers to argue that the uSSR had 
joined the war alongside Germany: 
War, like revolution, is distinguished by the fact that at a blow it destroys idiotic 
formulas and reveals the naked reality underneath. “Defense of democracy” is an 
empty formula. the invasion of Poland is a bloody reality […]. the kremlin not 
only deceived Chamberlain, Daladier, and Beck, but also, and systematically, 
the working classes of the Soviet union and the entire world. Some fatuous 
people and snobs accuse me of being impelled to make horrible predictions out 
of “hatred” of Stalin. As if serious people allow themselves to be swayed by their personal feelings in questions of historical importance! The inexorable 
facts prove that reality is more horrible than all the predictions that i made. 
in entering Polish territory, the Soviet armies knew beforehand at what point 
they would meet — and as allies, not as enemies — with the armies of Hitler. 
the operation was determined in its main points by the secret clauses of the 
German-Soviet pact; the general staffs of both countries were to be found in 
constant collaboration; the Stalinist invasion is nothing but a symmetrical 
supplement of the Hitlerite operations. Such are the facts.10
However, contrary to the conclusions that some of trotsky’s political allies came 
to regarding the pact, and despite the virulence with which he himself denounced 
9. See naomi Allen, ed., leon trotsky, Writings of leon trotsky, vol. 12 (new York: 
Pathfinder, 1977).
10. Article dated September 18, 1939, ibid, p. 80.
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Stalin’s “loyalty to Hitler” and his violent, bureaucratic imperialism, trotsky 
nonetheless argued that as a workers’ state, albeit degenerated, the uSSR should 
be defended if attacked; he also argued for the objectively revolutionary nature of 
expansion in Poland and the Baltic states.11
the press focused on similarities in method between Hitler and Stalin, sometimes 
describing them as totalitarian: the aim was to equate brutal policies of Might which 
relied on sheer brute strength, ignoring the principles of international law and the 
collective community of nations.
the new York times published an editorial on october 3, 1939 which argued that 
the swift and cold blooded manner in which sovereign nations are summoned 
one by one to hear what their future status is to be shows Stalin to be something more than an apt imitator of Hitler. His method of intimidation and conquest is quicker and quieter. 
The editorial of October 11 proved to be visionary in the light of subsequent events: 
“Russia’s swift invasion of the Baltic sets a new record in the current competition 
for naked aggression.” However, the foregrounding of convergences between 
Hitler’s and Stalin’s policies of aggression in autumn 1939 and the theoretical 
explanations of the two camps – democracies versus totalitarian regimes – did not 
lead politically to the possibility of war being declared against the uSSR as an ally 
of Hitler. Most political leaders continued to see the uSSR as a special case.
the geopolitical vision shared widely by European diplomats, placing Soviet 
imperial power in the tradition of the Czars, stopped them from seeing the uSSR as 
an ally of Hitler irst and foremost when the Red Army invaded Poland. The horizon 
of events foretold by most commentators was the clash of two competing imperial 
powers ighting over zones of inluence in eastern Europe. Most commentators 
highlighted the ambiguity of the Soviet position. telegrams exchanged by Payart, 
the French chargé d’affaires in Moscow, and Daladier, president of the Conseil in 
Paris, and by the Quai d’Orsay and the Foreign Ofice, relect the intention to leave 
the range of interpretations wide open to avoid going along with German-Soviet 
collusion.12 the Red Army’s invasion of eastern Poland was described as tragic and 
sinister, but at the same time was seen as an opportunity to widen the divide between 
Moscow and Berlin in the more or less short term. Consequently, the invasion 
was not met by any protest. the Western powers refused to read German-Soviet 
collaboration simply in terms of a military alliance and often invoked the invasion’s 
preventive dimension, crediting Moscow with wanting to stop the German advance 
as it was beginning to threaten the Romanian border and, from there, the Balkans.
11. Victor Serge foresaw the coming clash between the uSSR and Germany, but refused to 
consider Soviet expansion an objectively progressive element. He held that “the two totalitarian 
dictatorships are in fact allied against their own populations,” la Wallonie (october 21, 1939), Retour à l’Ouest: Chroniques 1936-1940 (Ed. Agone, 2010), 290.
12. Documents diplomatiques français, 1939, 3 septembre-31 décembre, Brussels: PiE-P. lang, 
2002, passim. 
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once the demarcation line between the Germans and Soviets had been laid 
down on September 22, leaving the oilields of Galicia and the wheat ields of 
Volhynia to the Soviets, the withdrawal of nazi troops was not seen as a tangible 
sign of an alliance between the uSSR and Germany. Rather, it was seen to indicate 
Stalin’s sway over Hitler. only the Americans thought otherwise. the declaration 
of September 28 that sealed the friendship between Berlin and Moscow and their 
new common border shed some light on the situation: lloyd George declared to the 
House of Commons that “there is a good deal that we do not know.”13 However, 
he added, and Churchill agreed, that there were good grounds not to equate Stalin’s 
action with Hitler’s in the division of Poland, as the two men had different visions.
Anti-Communism was likewise a key element in leading public opinion to 
distinguish between war against Germany and action against the uSSR. Anti-
Communism was on the rise in 1939. the volte-face of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact lifted the ban on all overt expressions of anti-Communism imposed by 
the policy of collective security and anti-Fascism, led by Soviet diplomats and the 
Comintern in the mid-1930s. As Raymond Aron noted in his Memoirs in autumn 
1939, “my anti-Communism, half-suppressed by my friendships and the need for 
Soviet support against the third Reich, burst forth.”14 Grzybowski, the former 
Polish ambassador to Moscow, held that 
no other totalitarian system has achieved such complete absolutism […]. 
the entire Government in the union of Soviet Socialist Republics is nothing but 
a system for the preparation within the Soviets of an instrument for revolution and the conquest of Europe.15
théodore Aubert’s international Anti-Communist Entente, based in Geneva and 
with branches in many European countries, intensiied its efforts in autumn 1939. 
the iAE was virulently anti-Communist, the Comintern being its prime enemy; 
it looked favourably on authoritarian and fascist regimes elsewhere in Europe, 
such as Franco’s Spain, Mussolini’s italy, and nazi Germany, particularly when 
the anti-Comintern pact was founded in 1936. However, the iAE considered 
that nazi Germany betrayed the anti-Bolshevist cause in signing the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact. Aubert’s comment was that they had left the anti-Comintern 
pact for a pro-Comintern pact. in autumn 1939, the iAE sent its corresponding 
members an account of all Radio Moscow broadcasts and a review of the leading 
Soviet newspapers, including local papers, covering the Soviet war in Poland and 
13. General Sikorski Historical institute, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, 
vol. 1, london: Heinemann, 1961, p. 57. 
14. “Mon anticommunisme, à demi refoulé par mes amitiés et par besoin de l’appui soviétique 
contre le iiie Reich, éclata au dehors,” Raymond Aron, Mémoires (P.: julliard, 1983), 158. 
15. Final report presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by former Ambassador 
Grzybowski, Paris, november 6, 1939, Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945, 
document 69.
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Soviet tutelage in the Baltic states. the aim was to convince the Western powers to 
join the struggle against the uSSR.16
the Soviet attack on Finland sparked a new, widely aired wave of openly anti-
Communist discourse, as shown by the way the media leapt to Finland’s defence and 
the vote by the Geneva Assembly to exclude the uSSR from the league of nations. 
The wave of support for brave little Finland ighting against the Soviet giant can 
also be seen as a way of winning back the moral high ground, a year after Munich. 
However, the outbreak of the Winter War also followed the anti-Bolshevik model of 
the civil war period, reviving memories of foreign intervention in 1918-1920. An iAE 
mission travelled to Finland, describing the country’s struggle defending Christian 
values and civilisation against Bolshevism. Marshal Mannerheim, commander-in-
chief of Finnish forces during the Winter War, was in fact an honorary member of 
the IAE board. The IAE representatives were allowed to question Red Army soldiers 
taken prisoner by the Finns to carry out a survey of living conditions and attitudes 
in the uSSR.17 Such denunciations challenged only the Soviet regime, though 
convergences with Germany were highlighted as a result of the friendship between 
the two. the German attack on the uSSR in 1941 was welcomed by the iAE, which 
considered that Germany was inally back on track after two wasted years, defending 
European civilisation against the hydra of revolution.
the rhetoric of the crusades likewise dominated political discourse. While Britain’s 
military experts saw the Soviet attack on Finland as an opportunity to get around 
neutral norway and send battalions to keep watch on communication channels and 
German trade18, the plans for the Murmansk landing and for bombing oil wells in the 
Caucasus, neither of which came to fruition, nonetheless harked back to their earlier 
strategies for foreign intervention. Anti-Communist activism was clearly encouraged 
by the revolutionary grounds the Soviets put forward for attacking Finland.
When it came to describing the events of autumn 1939, the ideological struggle 
against Bolshevism and the geopolitical vision of the uSSR as a Russian imperial 
power and a natural enemy of the third Reich were major barriers to the political uptake 
of anti-totalitarian struggle that some activists and intellectuals had already begun to 
engage in by developing the debate on the nazi and Stalinist policies of aggression. 
Accumulating experiences:  
a repertoire of modes of aggression and defence against aggression
understanding the difference in and disconnect between attitudes to the German and 
Soviet wars of 1939 means taking account of the accumulation of experiences in the 
inter-war period. Many of the arguments used by the Soviets to justify their actions in 
16. iAE (international Anti-Communist Entente) archives, Geneva library, vols. 1597 and 1786.
17. ibid., vol. 3007.
18. Colonel Roderick Macleod, Denis kelly, eds., the ironside Diaries 1937-1940 (london: 
Constable, 1963), 181-197.
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autumn 1939 had already been heard elsewhere and were understandable for people of 
the day. Many aggressive practices created a feeling of déjà vu, which limited expressions 
of indignation and calls to resist. the main factor, however, was the tendency to sectorise 
the war to save the peace, which played against total war in 1939.
Michael Walzer’s philosophical treatise on just and unjust wars notes that aggression 
is the sole name given to crimes between states.19 it covers all forms of violation 
of territorial integrity and political sovereignty, whether the annexation of part of a 
state’s territory, the forced implementation of a satellite regime, or the suppression of 
a state’s independence. international law is a very broad brush compared to criminal 
law’s gradation of crimes involving violations against property or people. Michael 
Walzer sees this as a positive undertaking. the concept of aggression would crumble 
if a list of crimes analogous to those in use in criminal law were available. the nazi 
leaders were accused and found guilty of aggression at the nuremberg trials for both 
the “peaceful” invasion of Czechoslovakia and the “bloody” invasion of Poland.
Yet it seems to me that such a list had indeed begun to emerge in the 1930s, 
tending to undermine the very concept of aggression. there are indications of this 
in the league of nations debates that marked every case of aggression from the 
japanese annexation of Manchuria, the italo-Abyssinian War, and the Spanish 
Civil War, to japanese aggression in China, the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, and 
so on. Each case proved to be unique and led the League of Nations to hedge the 
issue, introducing differentiated modes of arbitration, conciliation, and sanctions, 
implying a greater or lesser degree of seriousness and shared responsibility. 
Attitudes of the day were dominated by the fear of war and the need to appease 
aggressors. the ultimatum “Your money or your life” was laid down several times 
in 1938-1939, and the leaders of the states forced to answer often preferred to 
hand over their resources and territory to avoid bringing war down on themselves 
and their allies and death on their fellow countrymen. Consequently, the aggressee 
enabled the aggressor not to pass for a murderer in the eyes of the international 
community. until total open war came in 1941, the vision was one of a patchwork 
of juxtaposed wars. Some were in the Far East, others in eastern Europe; some were 
national in origin, some were civil wars, while others were caused by the German 
demand for lebensraum. Most broke out without war being declared. 
the Soviets by no means stood apart from the league of nations debates; 
they even played a part in drawing up an international law to combat aggression. 
it is true to say that the uSSR was not represented on all committees, and it was 
much less involved than the British and French delegations throughout the 1930s. 
European reservations about involving Bolsheviks too closely in the league’s 
activities echoed Stalin’s recommendations to be cautious, his priority being to 
keep the peace through bilateral relations. For example, though the uSSR joined 
the league of nations in September 1934, litvinov was not granted permission for 
19. Michael Walzer, Guerres justes et injustes, (P.: Gallimard, 2006) [just and unjust Wars: 
A moral argument with historical illustrations, new York: Basic, 1977]. See Daniel R. Brunstetter, Jean-Vincent Holeindre, “La guerre juste au prisme de la théorie politique,” Raisons politiques, 45, 1 (2012): 5-18.
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Soviet delegates to sit on the committee set up on February 24, 1933 to condemn 
japan’s aggression against Manchuria.20 Despite such obstacles, the presence of 
Soviet diplomats in Geneva meant that the uSSR became involved in a number 
of collective actions to resolve conlict. The Soviet delegates at the League of Nations 
played a signiicant role in implementing sanctions when the Italo-Abyssinian 
War broke out in autumn 1935. they were also active on the non-intervention 
Committee against intervention in Spanish affairs, eventually speaking out against 
its hypocrisy and inaction.21 they agreed to sit on the Consultative Committee on 
the Far East – formerly the Manchurian Committee – which was reconvened in 
1937 when the Second Sino-japanese War broke out.22 they were also the most 
active support behind Beneš, then in exile in Chicago, in his demand that the league 
take action when Czechoslovakia was dismantled in March 1939.23 Maisky, Soviet 
Plenipotentiary to Great Britain and member of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, 
was at that time president of the league of nations Council. 
the prevalent discourses in the 1930s justifying and legitimising interference 
and intervention in neighbouring states or advocating collective resistance were thus 
familiar to both the Soviets and their European counterparts and the Soviets played 
a part in developing a number of key notions. First and foremost, in the context of 
japanese aggression, the legal department at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs 
started work on a deinition of the aggressor, presented by Litvinov in Geneva 
in February 1933 and later reused by Molotov during tripartite negotiations over 
assistance alongside the French and British over the course of the spring and 
summer of 1939.24 Against the backdrop of japanese aggression in the Far East, 
which the Soviets feared they might have to face alone in 1932-1933, litvinov’s 
notion of indivisible peace proved useful in rejecting the tendency to localise wars. 
The notion, which aimed to establish links between conlicts, aggressors, and 
theatres of war, remained the theoretical underpinning for the Soviet position in 
1938, while Moscow denounced the principle of localising war as fascist theory.25 
Such notions, debated by the legal department and the Service for league of nations 
20. letter from litvinov to the PB, october 22, 1934, AVP RF, (Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki 
Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 05/14/96/10.
21. on the various stages of the Soviet delegation’s involvement in Geneva, see Sabine Dullin, 
Des hommes d’influences: les ambassadeurs de Staline en Europe, 1930-1939 (P.: Payot, 2001) 
[Men of influence: Stalin’s diplomats in Europe, 1930-1939, Edinburgh university Press, 2008].
22. the committee’s activities are recorded in a large number of files in the league of nations 
archives, Geneva, R3607-3612, R3671-R3680. For example, the information available to the 
members of the Consultative Committee on the Far East includes all the reports on the border 
incidents between Manchukuo and Mongolia since 1932, league of nations archives, R3609.
23. ibid., R3640.
24. Project to define the terms “aggressor,” january 14, 1933, note by Egoriev for the Central 
committee on the work of disarmament and the uSSR’s position, December 1933, litvinov to 
the Politburo, january 25 1933, AVP RF, 05/13/90/11; litvinov’s speech of February 6, 1933, 
SSSR v bor´be za mir, rechi i dokumenty (M., 1938), 11.
25. See for example the transcript of the meeting of the Scientific Council at the law institute (Academy 
of Sciences), August 25 1938, RAn (Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk), 1934/1/67, p. 15.
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Affairs at the NKID, were held to be important at a time when the “question of 
borders and territories,”26 in the words of the diplomats, was of crucial signiicance 
to their leaders in the kremlin. the context did indeed represent a threat to Soviet 
borders, due to japanese and German aggressiveness and the recurrent assessment 
of neighbouring countries as military parade grounds for the aggressors.27
Every instance of international aggression gave rise to analyses in Moscow, 
based on sources and publications from the league of nations and the states in 
question. The analyses were carried out not only by the diplomatic service but 
also by various research institutes with expertise in international issues.28 these 
institutes were far more than propaganda outlets bringing the decisions taken at the 
highest level to the masses: they worked with various political and administrative 
bodies with international responsibilities, such as the Central Committee, the 
Politburo, the Comintern, and the People’s Commissariats, particularly for Foreign 
Affairs. They also played a signiicant role in outlining the key issues of the day.29 
Signiicant players in the debate on war and aggression included the Institute of 
World Economy and Politics, founded in April 1925 as part of the Communist 
Academy and headed by Varga30 since the late 1920s, and the law institute, under 
the leadership of Pashukanis until 1937 and then Vyshinsky, who oversaw the 
creation of a section speciically devoted to international law in 1938.31 the section 
brought together academic legal specialists and researchers from Moscow and the 
provinces and practitioners of international law, particularly members of the nkiD 
law department.32 one of its most prominent members, ilya trainin, published a 
26. “Pogranichno-territorial´nyi vopros,” Dokumenty Vneshnei politiki SSSR (1930-1938), 
vols. 19-21 (M., 1976), DVP SSSR, 1939 god, t. XXii, vol.1 (M., 1992), passim. 
27. See for example the Russian “platsdarm,” borrowed from the French “place d’armes,” 
which was widely used in Soviet rhetoric.
28. on international expertise in the uSSR, see oded Eran, Mezhdunarodniki: An Assessment 
of Professional Expertise in the Making of Soviet Foreign Policy (tel Aviv, 1979).
29. See for example karl Radek’s informative analysis of the italo-Abyssinian War, which was 
debated at a meeting of the institute of World Economy and Politics. the analysis was detailed 
enough to serve as an aide-memoire for the leaders of the CC and was also used as a guide for agitprop aiming to explain and legitimise Soviet action on the Abyssinia question: “Italo-
abissinskii konflikt,” october 3, 1935, RAn, 354/2/184, 43 p. See also RAn, 354/1.
30. Eugen Varga was a Hungarian economist and one of the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1919. He began working for the Comintern in Moscow in 1920 and joined the group in 
charge in 1928. He headed the institute of World Economy and Politics from october 1927 on. 
letters dating from the 1930s reflect his special relationship with Stalin: see the Academy of 
Sciences (RAn) archives, Moscow, collection 1513, op. 1, d. 198 (1513/1/198).
31. the institute of Soviet Construction (institut sovetskogo stroitel´stva), which had been part 
of the Communist Academy since 1925, was renamed the institute of Soviet Construction and 
law in 1936, when it joined the Academy of Sciences. it became the institute of law in 1938. 
RAn, collection 1934, istoricheskaia spravka.
32. Members of the section included il´ia trainin, professor and researcher at the Communist 
Academy since the 1920s, B.A. landau, jurist at the Sverdlovsk institute, who took over the 
periodical review of foreign literature (books and journals) and the corresponding section in 
the journal Sovetskoe gosudarstvo in 1938, and Vladimir Egoriev of the nkiD law department, 
spiski chlenov Sektsii mezhdunarodnogo prava, RAn, 1934/1/62, p. 1-7.
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highly signiicant book entitled the Defense of Peace and Criminal law (1937), 
which criticised the league of nations for failing to create an international criminal 
court to punish aggressors33. the section of international law’s work programme 
for 1938-1939 focused on the concept of territory in contemporary international 
law, particularly the practice of referenda and the regimes of border territories, 
modes of aggression, and conlict prevention and resolution.34 Similarly, reading 
articles published in 1937-1939 in Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika, the 
excellent, well-informed journal published by the institute of World Economy and 
Politics, it becomes clear the extent to which Soviet leaders drew on the modes 
of aggression against Abyssinia, China, and Czechoslovakia as a concrete source of 
inspiration, despite oficial denunciations. They include descriptions of how to stoke 
provocation and organise incidents, the pretexts given by aggressors for launching 
armed operations and invading foreign territories in the case of Abyssinia and 
China, details of how Czechoslovakia was dismantled, the annexation of Memel, 
and Germany’s efforts to undermine Danzig.35 the increasingly common practice of 
violating state borders without declaring war also caught the eye of Soviet experts. 
the German jurist Rupert von Schumacher’s book Der Raum als Waffe (Berlin, 
1935), which explored the issue, was reviewed, and pamphlets and books were 
published on the question, including a book on Czechoslovakia (Gospolitizdat, late 
1938) and another in early 1939 on the Ukrainian question raised by the Germans, 
Hungarians, and Poles over Carpathian Ruthenia and ukraine.36 lemin, who 
was one of the most proliic researchers at the Institute of World Economy and 
Politics and a keen reader of everyone from toynbee to German nazis, wrote two 
enlightening articles on the second imperialist war in 1939.37
A number of ideas arise from the Soviet harvesting of information and analysis. 
First and foremost among them is the powerful notion that the practices of 
colonialism were now being applied to Europe. Rome based its entire justiication 
for the invasion of Abyssinia following the Walwal incident on the right of a colonial 
power to intervene when it came to guaranteeing public order in outlying territories 
33. Francine Hirsch, “the Soviets at nuremberg: international law, Propaganda, and the 
Making of the Postwar order,” American Historical Review, 113, 3 (june 2008): 701-730.
34. transcript of the Scientific Council meeting to discuss the programme on international 
public law, August 25, 1938, RAn, 1934/1/67, 40 p.
35. Border incidents were a regular occurrence as tensions rose between the government of 
the free city and the Polish authorities: examples include the kalthof incident on the border 
between Danzig and eastern Prussia on May 20, 1939 and the death of a Polish border guard 
on july 20, 1939. the declaration of war on Poland on September 1 was again based on a 
border incident.
36. the authors are respectively F. kozo, Chekhoslovakiia (Gospolitizdat, 1938) and Z. lippai, 
Bor´ba imperialistov v Dunaiskom basseine (Gospolitizdat, 1939). Both also contributed 
articles on the same subjects to Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika.
37. “Problemy vtoroi imperialisticheskoi voiny,” Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika, n° 1 
(1939): 29-44, and n° 3 (1939): 87-104. i. lemin was a historian specialising in international 
relations and Great Britain. He joined the VkP(b) in 1918 and began working with the institute 
of World Economy and Politics in 1933.
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where it was a problem, in this instance because the negus was unable to maintain 
order. the italian High Commissioner in East Africa made a proclamation to the 
inhabitants of tigre on october 3, 1935, that “[t]o avoid your lands being damaged 
by war and to help the numerous inhabitants of tigre and other regions who have 
called upon our protection, i have ordered our troops to cross the Mareb.”38 Given a 
certain number of analyses favourable to italy’s civilising mission in Ethiopia, the 
deinition of the aggressor drawn up in 1933 based on Litvinov’s project was not 
applicable outside Europe. the simple fact of an army unit crossing a border within 
a colonial possession could not necessarily be considered an act of aggression if 
the border was little marked on the ground and if incursions, raids, and bandits 
threatened the lives and property of the local population. One much-quoted example 
was the far reaches of the British empire, where expeditions were often carried out 
across borders to maintain public order. the same argument was made when japan 
invaded Manchuria, then China: japanese and korean inhabitants needed protecting 
from Chinese exactions. European supporters of China in 1937-1938 devoted their 
efforts to highlighting China’s fast-paced modernisation and the ability of its leaders 
to keep control over its entire territory and guarantee public order.
The speciicity of the colonial situation was challenged when the same methods 
were used in Europe and China in 1939: the japanese and German aggressors 
frequently used border incidents as pretexts, and Germany created a protectorate 
in the case of Bohemia and Moravia. lemin described Bohemia in March 1939 as 
a colony of German imperialism, adding that “the regime that has been put in place 
in the country is one that was until now ‘common’ only in distant colonies in Africa 
or Asia.”39
the Soviet analysis that colonial methods were being imported into non-colonised 
regions shaped the uSSR’s public diplomacy, which, until the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact and the summer of 1939, focused on the need to protect the sovereignty and 
independence of smaller and medium-sized states facing the threat of Fascist 
aggression. it should be borne in mind that many advocates of collective security 
saw the Soviets as the best defenders of small states whose existence was threatened 
by the major powers.40 However, it should also be added that the extent to which 
this was seen as a good thing very much depended on geographical proximity to 
the uSSR. it was much less present in those states bordering the uSSR: for them, 
the protection offered by their larger neighbour was unwelcome, even dangerous.
38. nicolas Basilesco, la SDn devant les conflits internationaux et spécialement devant le 
conflit italo-éthiopien (Bucarest, 1936).
39. i. lemin, “Problemy vtoroi imperialisticheskoi voiny,” Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia 
politika, n° 3: 96. 
40. As seen against the backdrop of events in Geneva from the disarmament conference to 
Munich, Soviet policy appeared to be at pains to defend those states excluded from important 
decisions by the major powers. one significant indicator was litvinov’s remark to krestinsky 
on june 23, 1932, that “the smaller powers, especially the Scandinavians, are very irritated 
by the procedure but dare not show it. this explains in part the applause i received yesterday 
at the commission, because the smaller powers recognised my speech as their megaphone,” 
Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki SSSR (M., 1969) vol. 15, n° 260, 382.
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it must be said that the Soviet analysis did distance itself from the protection of 
national minorities – a position that it had made its own in the 1920s and that was 
used abundantly by the Germans and Hungarians in 1938-1939 – before eventually 
returning to it in September 1939. i shall illustrate this point with the example of 
the ukraine.
The Ukrainian question became a burning issue across Europe for the irst time 
in the post-Munich period.41 Articles on the ukraine were printed not only in the 
Soviet press and in papers targeted at the Russian and ukrainian diaspora, but also 
in European journals and newspapers from both ends of the political spectrum. 
in France, for example, December 1938 and january 1939 saw the publication of 
articles on the ukraine in le temps, le Figaro, le Matin, l’illustration, je suis 
partout, Gringoire, and Politique étrangère. on november 21, 1938, Paris Soir 
published an article commemorating the thousandth anniversary of the marriage 
of Anne of kiev and Henri i of France, telling readers that “nazi propaganda has 
made [the ukraine] its new goal.” the headline on the cover of the Swiss Courrier 
de Genève for December 27, 1938 was “Will the ukraine recover its independence 
some day?”42 the ethnographic map of the ukraine defended by the standard-
bearers of the ukrainian national ideal at the post-war conferences was all over 
the newspapers. the new wave of interest in the ukraine came about because of 
the initial dismembering of Czechoslovakia following Munich and Hungarian 
and ukrainian claims to Ruthenia, once part of the Hungarian side of the Austro-
Hungarian empire that became part of Czechoslovakia under the treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-laye. Hungary annexed the Hungarian regions of southern Slovakia 
and western Ruthenia around uzhgorod, Mukachevo, and Beregovo at the Vienna 
arbitration of november 2, 1938. this marked the beginning of an orchestrated 
German campaign debating the ukrainian claim to the rest of Ruthenia, which 
might become a new expanse of the ukrainian territories under German protection, 
bringing with it the lands of eastern Galicia and Volhynia taken from Poland, or 
even the Soviet ukraine in the long run. the campaign, encouraged by Berlin, 
lasted until Hungary annexed Ruthenia the following March: this option won out 
over the potentially autonomous Carpatho-ukraine as a German protectorate, which 
Voloshyn and Révaý’s short-lived government in khust had campaigned for.43 
Germany also stepped in to protect the Slovaks against the Czechs in early 1939. 
Soviet observers highlighted the importance to Germany of undermining internal 
politics by recruiting agents, informants, and activists in favour of the German and/or 
nazi cause throughout eastern Europe: those recruited were mainly Germans, 
41. the 1933 famine had given rise to a first wave of media interest in the ukraine across 
Europe, but only in the anti-Soviet and anti-Communist press; it was less widely debated than 
in 1938-39 due to the embarrassed silence of the leaders of anti-Fascist opinion. 
42. See the very comprehensive international press review on the Ukraine question compiled 
by the iAE in the iAE archives, vol. 1674.
43. on the history of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia/transcarpathian ukraine, see Paul Robert 
Magocsi, A History of ukraine, university of Washington Press, 1996, and Valentina Mar´ina, 
Zakarpatskaia ukraina v politike Benesha i Stalina (M.: novyi khronograf, 2003).
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Slovaks, and ukrainians, but also included others involved in far-right politics. 
the Western diplomats based in Czechoslovakia in the post-Munich period 
all noted that German-Bohemians, Slovaks, and even Ruthenians were being 
instrumentalised to organise support for German demands from within.44 
the protection of minorities, which could pose a threat to the integrity of the 
uSSR in the long run, was closely observed by the Soviets, and was denounced 
in the press. Stalin spoke ironically at the eighteenth Party congress on March 10, 
1939 of “madmen […] who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet 
ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian ukraine.” the Soviet press 
wrote about German “comedies.”45 the choice made by the Soviets in spring 1939 
was thus to present themselves as defending the integrity and independence of 
small and medium-sizes states in eastern Europe, repeating that the Bolsheviks had 
helped them into existence in 1920-21. 
over the course of the spring of 1939, Soviet analyses of the impending second 
imperialist war were based on an updating of the theory of just and unjust wars – then 
fairly new terminology in Soviet writing.46 just war arose from the convergence of 
class war and national wars of de-colonisation in small and medium-sized European 
countries under the rule of fascist colonisers. this theorisation offered the advantage 
of including anti-fascist activism and the revolutionary ideal, while re-stating the 
right of peoples to self-determination in the face of imperialist threats.
Reversal in continuity – the Soviets in july-December 1939  
and the use of accumulated experience
Maisky, Soviet Plenipotentiary to Great Britain and member of the Soviet delegation 
at the league of nations, sent a letter to litvinov in november 1935, shortly after 
the outbreak of the italo-Abyssinian War. He began by evoking the considerable 
decline in France’s reputation in Geneva, before adding, “there remain only two 
great powers with immaculate reputations in the mind of the league of nations: 
England and the uSSR.”47 This letter, though highly self-satisied in tone, does 
relect a genuine state of affairs. Following Litvinov’s reinvigoration of Soviet 
diplomacy and the Comintern’s Frontist turn of 1934-1935, the Soviet union had 
come to be seen by some parties devoted to peace, progress, and anti-fascism as 
positive supporters of league of nations policy, while Soviet diplomats and experts 
alike helped shape international law on aggression and legitimate self-defence. 
44. See George F. kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic Papers, 1938-1940 
(Princeton, 1968).
45. See for example F. kozo, “Zavershenie miunkhenskoi raspravy nad Chekhoslovakiei,” 
Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika, n° 3: 104-108.
46. However, even Marx and lenin could yield to normative moral arguments in their own 
analyses: Marx did so in his attitude to the Franco-Prussian War, lenin in discussing the 
violation of Belgian neutrality. See Walzer, Guerres justes et injustes, 149 and 434. 
47. Maisky to litvinov, november 25, 1935, AVP RF, 010/10/48/7.
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At the same time, the repertoire of types of discourse and practices used to legitimise 
aggression that had sprung up over the course of the 1930s was familiar enough to 
serve Stalinist policy should the need arise, it being was keen to make the most of 
a tricky situation, fraught with danger and opportunity.
the Soviet leadership had two main objectives in mind in the summer of 1939: 
guaranteeing the country’s safety, extending its gaze to neighbouring states that, 
though reluctant, might need the uSSR’s protection, and avoiding becoming 
embroiled in the “second imperialist war.” This required effective guarantees of 
“assistance” and inding ways to be a non-aggressor.
The irst notion to appeal to the Soviets was that of indirect aggression, which 
can provide legitimate grounds for taking preventive guarantees. The deinition of 
aggression put forward by litvinov in the london Protocol of july 3-4, 1933 included 
ive points: the declaration of war, invasion, armed attack, naval blockades, and 
“support accorded armed bands which are organized on its territory and which shall 
have invaded the territory of another State; or refusal, in spite of the demand of the 
invaded State, to take on its own territory all steps in its power to deprive the bandits 
aforesaid of all aid or protection.”48 the last point could be seen as a concession 
to the right to colonial-style interference in the case of a state unable to maintain 
public order. However, for litvinov and the Bolsheviks, it meant something else. 
it was about the reality of the situation along the Soviet borders, where buffer zones 
– some demilitarised – had had to be established after the civil war, together with 
concrete conciliation procedures with neighbouring states to try and bring an end 
to altercations and armed skirmishes. this had then led to the signature of bilateral 
non-aggression pacts, followed up by the london Protocol. the Bolshevik stance, 
shaped by the feeling of being encircled by capitalists, is apparent in the use of the 
word “refusal” to co-operate. the term suggests ideological or political mistrust, 
even hostility. Molotov then expanded on this Bolshevik addition to international 
law in july 1939 during the tripartite negotiations with France and the uk on 
mutual assistance. the mechanism of assistance was supposed to come into effect 
in instances of “direct or indirect aggression against one of the European countries 
whose defence of independence or neutrality is held to be indispensable by one 
of the three signatories.” Molotov suggested that indirect aggression should be 
deined as “an internal change or a change of policy favourable to an aggressor” 
and put forward a list of countries potentially affected by such indirect aggression: 
Estonia, Finland, latvia, Poland, Romania, Greece, and Belgium.49 He referred to 
two precedents to justify his proposal: the irst, which should have been deined 
as an indirect aggression at the time, as Beneš and the Soviets had suggested, was 
when Emil Hácha, president of Czechoslovakia, was threatened into agreeing to the 
48. the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, july 4, 1933, DVP SSSR, t. XVi 
(M.: Politizdat, 1970), 403-406. See also Alphonse Schwartz’s reaction published shortly after 
the event, les systèmes pour la paix et le protocole de londres des 3 et 4 juillet 1933 sur la 
définition de l’agresseur (university of Poitiers, law Faculty, 1934) 59-60. 
49. Molotov’s response to the latest Franco-British proposals, july 3, 1939, God krizisa, 
1938-1939, vol. 2 (M.: Gospolitizdat, 1990), 80-81.
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occupation of his country as a protectorate on March 15 that year. the second was 
the Naziication of Danzig, which left little doubt as to the situation’s “peaceful” 
outcome. the British representatives refused the notion of indirect aggression, 
however, since it could potentially justify interfering in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign nation: Estonia and latvia had signed pacts of non-aggression with 
Germany in early june.
in fact, Soviet diplomacy had already shared its understanding of the guarantee 
of assistance with neighbouring countries when litvinov offered the Baltic states 
a unilateral guarantee in case of aggression on March 28, which stated that the 
uSSR “cannot remain a passive bystander in the case of economic or political 
domination by Germany or in the case of territorial concessions or cessions.”50 
Romania had been given a similar warning on March 27 after signing an economic 
agreement with Germany: the uSSR “cannot remain a passive bystander in the 
case of an aggressor state’s domination of Romania and the creation of bases 
near our border or in the Black Sea ports.”51 the Soviet message was mixed: 
the rhetoric of offering protection to small and medium-sized states against 
fascist aggression, characteristic of earlier years, could lead to the argument that 
intervention was necessary in neighbouring states. the Soviets could argue that 
they were entering small states eager to stay of out of the conlict on preventive 
grounds if the state in question could potentially be used for military purposes 
by a presumed adversary. this was the argument the Soviets used on the Baltic 
states and Finland. the idea was not new: it had been explored by Hegel and was 
at the heart of Bethmann Hollweg’s argument justifying the violation of Belgian 
neutrality on August 4, 1914.52 
the issue of assistance to neighbouring countries did not fundamentally 
change even following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. the secret protocols were 
underpinned by the notion of exclusive zones of inluence.53 Stalin’s demands 
in eastern Poland and the Baltic were intended to block all possibility of indirect 
aggression by providing a military presence and, in the medium term, to bring about 
complete political alignment with Moscow. this appears very clearly in Stalin’s 
discussions with Baltic leaders in late September and early october 1939, when the 
latter were forced to sign pacts of mutual assistance and to accept Soviet military 
50. these declarations followed Germany’s Memel ultimatum that lithuania was forced to 
accept. DVP, vol. 22, book 1, 231-232.
51. the economic agreement signed on March 23 gave Germany the monopoly in exploiting 
Romanian oil. litvinov held it to be “an agreement to enslavement”: litvinov to Stalin, March 
27, 1939, ibid., p. 230.
52. Hegel argued that war was just if it guaranteed the security of the state: preventive wars 
could be necessary against small neighbouring states coveted by a rival power. See john 
A. Moses, “la théorie de la guerre juste dans l’Empire allemand (1871-1918),” Mil neuf cent. 
Revue d’histoire intellectuelle, 1, 23 (2005): 149.
53. Sergei Sluch, “o nekotorykh problemakh diplomaticheskoi bor´by v kanun vtoroi mirovoi 
voiny,” Politicheskii krizis 1939 g. i strany tsentral´noi i iugo-Vostochnoi Evropy (M.: RAn, 
1989), 98-99.
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bases.54 the Baltic leaders tried to defend themselves by raising deliberately naive 
questions: what risk was there to their neutrality and what enemy was the USSR 
proposing to protect them from, since Germany was now a friend and it seemed 
highly unlikely that Britain would attack them? However, Stalin and Molotov’s 
thinking as a whole remained anchored in the experiences of Czechoslovakia and 
Danzig that same year: some kind of collateral was necessary as a guarantee, since 
it was always possible that the enemy might try some underhand tactics and only 
total control could guarantee security. it should be borne in mind that the political 
perspective of the “total security state” dominated all sectors of activity in the uSSR 
under Stalin at that time.55
Behind the irst ultimatum to Estonia was the Orzel incident, involving a Polish 
submarine, held in port in tallinn according to the law of neutrality, but which 
left for Britain on September 17. Moscow denounced Estonia’s neutrality as a 
fabrication and openly doubted the country’s ability to control its coastline. it then 
proposed a form of “co-operation among neighbours” to defend the Baltic coast 
against aggressors, presenting the plan as the crowning achievement of twenty 
years of good relations, following the treaties of 1920 and the non-aggression pacts 
of 1932. Alongside the inevitable reference to Peter the Great’s “Baltic window” 
and his foundation of Paldiski, Molotov and Stalin rooted their demands in the 
contemporary state of affairs and the state of war in Europe. Stalin saw his request 
for bases along the coastline as analogous to British demands for aerodromes 
and submarine ports in Sweden and their offer to purchase two of the country’s 
islands. Antanas Smetona, president of lithuania, saw the kaunas ultimatum as 
fundamentally similar to the German ultimatums, particular the demand for klaipeda 
in january: “the Soviet conception of law is similar to that of the Axis.”56 
the Soviets made twofold reference to mutual assistance in discussions with the 
Latvians. The irst of these was negative, referring to the pact with Czechoslovakia. 
Munich and March 1939 were two key precedents for the Soviets, demonstrating 
what they had to avoid. Moscow identiied a number of elements that were necessary 
for a pact to be effective. In military terms, an effective pact required a simpliied 
bilateral procedure rather than international guarantees, as well as military presence 
in the territory to be protected, or, at the very least, easy access to it. the pact 
also had to include the notion of indirect aggression. in the case of aggression 
against Czechoslovakia, however, the mechanism of assistance had been rendered 
inoperable irst by the Munich conference, then by Slovak independence and 
Emil Hácha’s agreement to become a protectorate. 
the second reference was positive, at least from the Soviet point of view: 
the mutual assistance pact with Mongolia. it raised hackles in tallinn, Riga, and 
kaunas, as the Baltic leaders did not want their futures to be compared to that 
54. E. krepp, Security and non-aggression: Baltic States and uSSR treaties of non-aggression, 
Problems of the Baltic iii (Stockholm, 1973).
55. Silvio Pons, Stalin and the inevitable war: 1936-1941 (london: Frank Cass, 2002).
56. Senn, lithuania 1940, 88.
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of Mongolia, a country with no international existence that was the USSR’s irst 
satellite state. However, military co-operation between Mongolia and the Soviets 
and the presence of the Red Army on Mongolian territory were a positive example 
for the kremlin, since they had led to victory over the japanese Manchurian army 
in the conlict sparked by the Khalkhin Gol incident.57 the Mongol model was 
called on several times over the course of 1939-1940: Mongolia’s alignment 
and satellisation went hand in hand with the preservation of formal sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, for which the Mongols and the Red Army had fought the 
japanese. neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland were able to say the same.
the other crucial issue for the kremlin was to stay out of the “second imperialist 
war.” It seemed possible: after all, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was oficially only 
a pact of non-aggression, as all the clauses relating to territory were kept secret. 
However, Soviet troops entering eastern Poland would undermine the subterfuge 
and reveal the nazi-Soviet alliance against Warsaw. this meant running the risk 
of war with France and Britain. on September 10, Molotov informed Schulenburg, 
the German ambassador in Moscow, that the Red Army had been caught unawares 
by the Wehrmacht’s lightning successes. Four days later, he informed Schulenburg 
that the Red Army was now prepared, but was waiting for Warsaw to fall before 
crossing the border.58 
the principal argument justifying the Red Army’s entry into Poland was the 
power vacuum and the ensuing chaos. the note sent to the Polish ambassador is 
unequivocal: 
the Polish State and its Government have, in point of fact, ceased to exist. 
in the same way, the Agreements concluded between the uSSR and Poland 
have ceased to operate. left to her own devices and bereft of leadership, Poland has become a suitable ield for all manner of hazards and surprises, which 
may constitute a threat to the uSSR.59 
A note sent to all the ambassadors in Moscow on September 17 again stated that 
the Red Army’s presence in Poland did not invalidate the uSSR’s neutrality in 
the war. the Soviets also prepared the ground for the troops to cross the border as 
peacefully as possible. the nkVD sent operational groups on special missions to 
Poland in late August 1939 to recruit local informants and agents who helped the 
units across the border rivers on the day of the invasion, taking the Polish border 
guards by surprise and sabotaging forts. Diversionary units consisting of locals and 
57. Account by the latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Munters, of talks with Stalin and 
Molotov, october 2, 1939, Polpredy soobshchaiut… Sbornik dokumentov ob otnosheniiakh 
SSSR s latviei, litvoi i Estoniei, avgust 1939g.-avgust 1940g. (M.: Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia, 1990), 75-77.
58. For a record of talks between Molotov and Schulenburg, see the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtiges Amtes, vol. 8, 34-35 and 47, quoted in Meltiukhov, upushchennyi shans Stalina, 
90-91.
59. DVP 1939 god (M.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992), t. 22, vol. 2, doc. 597, 96.
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agents from the uSSR also fought the Polish army from within.60 one of the main 
propaganda arguments advanced in the wake of the advancing Red Army was the 
need to protect the lives and property of the people of eastern Poland. the theme of 
restoring public order went hand in hand with measures taken to keep the troops in 
check. They were forbidden to coniscate grain or livestock, for example, and had 
to buy them from the local population. two measures were taken to avoid thefts 
and pillaging, turning the Red Army soldiers into eager consumers. they were paid 
one to three months’ salary in advance and an edict was issued establishing parity 
between the rouble and the zloty, with the consequence that traders in eastern 
Poland were forced to sell their wares very cheaply.61 Such assistance from abroad 
was presented as legitimate, since it put an end to civil war. At a local level, the Red 
Army’s entry into Poland sparked the pillaging of properties and revolt against the 
authorities of the Second Republic. the revolts in Skidel and Grodno were brutally 
crushed until the arrival of the Soviet soldiers put a stop to the repression.
the early days of the Second World War were shaped on the side of democracy 
by the counter-example of japan’s war in China, marked by exactions, massacres, 
rape, and bombing against civilian populations62. When France and Britain declared 
war on September 3, they speciically stated that their armies would not bomb 
civilian populations. the Soviet union likewise played the card of a “civilised” 
army operation the same month. only once the division of Poland was complete 
and Belorussia and western ukraine had been integrated into the Soviet republics 
did violent repression against the Polish population begin.
the arguments of the need to restore public order and protect the local population 
were largely heeded by the Western powers, as was the lack of any declaration of 
war by the USSR, which remained oficially neutral. While the British and French 
decision to declare war on Germany had been immediate, their attitude in the case 
of the uSSR’s invasion of Poland was “wait and see.” the Polish ambassador to 
Moscow (until September 16) argued in front of Sir William Seeds that Russia had 
no intention of attacking Poland. Diplomatic relations were not broken off even 
after the invasion, and Paris and london simply asked the Soviets to explain their 
behaviour on September 20. the arguments put forward by the Soviets in autumn 
1939 in the cases of Poland and the Baltic states were part of the shared heritage of 
1930s Europe: security, assistance, protection.
the uSSR once again brought up the issue of defending oppressed national 
minorities in ukraine and Belorussia as it was preparing to send the Red Army 
60. organy Gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi otechestvennoi voine. Sbornik 
dokumentov, vol. 1, book 1: noiabr´ 1938-dekabr´ 1940 (M.: Akademiia FSk, 1995), 70, 74, 
79, 85.
61. Directives issued by the nkVD in the uSSR, ukraine, and Belorussia on how work was 
to be organised in liberated districts, September 15, 1939, ibid., p. 79; see also jan t. Gross, Revolution from Abroad: The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western 
Belorussia (Princeton university Press, 1988).
62. See iris Chang, the Rape of nanking: the Forgotten Holocaust of World War two (new York: 
Basic Books, 1997) [iris Chang, le viol de nankin, P.: Payot, Petite Bibliothèque, 2007].
 HoW to WAGE WARFARE WitHout GoinG to WAR?  241 
over the border into Poland. the troops crossed the border with the idea – 
widely propagated by Soviet propaganda in liberated areas – that entering 
Poland was a means of bringing together the “blood brothers” of ukraine and 
Belorussia, separated by an unjust border since the treaty of Riga. it enabled 
the Soviets both to take revenge on Piłsudski’s imperialism63 and to complete the 
national projects left in abeyance following the First World War. the ukrainian 
national question and its ethnographic map were no longer mysteries to Europe 
following the media campaign earlier that year. Furthermore, the idea of protecting 
local populations against the German threat despite the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact 
did feature in the declarations of conscripts who took part in the Polish campaign. 
While the revolutionary perspective was heard on the ground – the aim was to free 
the ukrainians and Belorussians from landowners and the Polish bourgeoisie64 – it 
was largely absent from the discourse directed at international opinion and only men 
like Trotsky and Théodore Aubert were in a position to point out its signiicance. 
Similarly, when the Baltic states were placed under tutelage during the winter of 
1939-1940, there was nothing to suggest revolutionary motives or a desire for 
political and economic interference. the sole grounds for the action appeared to be 
military objectives for the sake of security.
the case of Finland was very different. the policy planned in Moscow was 
similar to that targeted at the Baltic states, but it failed: Helsinki turned down 
the pact of mutual assistance, refusing to grant the uSSR a thirty-year lease on the 
Hanko peninsula65 or to hand over a strip of land north of the border extending across 
the karelian isthmus from Vyborg to lake ladoga: doing so would neutralise the 
Mannerheim line. Finnish concessions over the gulf islands demanded by the Soviets 
in the April were not enough. Erkko, the Finnish Foreign Affairs Minister, stated 
on november 1 that he considered the Soviet demands to be Russian imperialism. 
talks were then held again from november 3 to 13, with Stalin himself intervening 
in the negotiations on november 4. However, Finland’s stance of resistance was 
supported by Britain, France, and the country’s Scandinavian neighbours and her 
position remained unchanged.66
the Soviets thus turned to their well-oiled arguments on legitimate self-defence 
to attack Finland. A border incident – real or staged – in the village of Mainila on 
the karelian isthmus on november 26 was presented as Finnish provocation, and 
63. Piłsudski died in 1935, but as victor in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 and founder of 
the Polish state, he was still seen as symbolising Poland’s territorial ambitions to the east. 
the so-called Pilsudskist bandits were targeted by the Soviet political police throughout the 
inter-war period.
64. Pravda, September 14, 1939; Pogranichnye voiska, 1939-1941 (M.: nauka, 1970), 237; 
poster by Viktor koretski, printed in four languages with a run of over 800,000 copies, featuring a quotation by Stalin: “Our army is an army of liberators.”
65. the Soviet plan was to build a naval base and coastal defences and to station an infantry 
regiment, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, two air regiments, and a tank batallion there – a 
total of five thousand men.
66. See o. Manninen and n.i. Baryshnikov, “Peregovory oseniu 1939 goda,” in Rzheshevskii, 
Vekhvilainen, eds., Zimniaia Voina 1939-1940, 113-130.
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Moscow demanded the withdrawal of all Finnish troops from a zone extending 
twenty to twenty-ive kilometres from the border. The Finnish reaction was 
to throw doubt on the presence of Finnish units during the incident in question. 
They suggested calling on the border commission to settle the question and decide 
whether the border zone should be neutralised on both sides. Moscow took this 
as a refusal and claimed that it freed the uSSR from its obligations under the 
non-aggression pact. A fresh spate of border incidents gave the Soviets the excuse 
they needed to break off diplomatic relations on november 29. 
Moscow then returned to the earlier arguments from the civil war period, when 
Red and White Finns fought over Helsinki, and adopted a revolutionary strategy 
targeted at persuading both the local population and international opinion. A Finnish 
popular government was formed on november 13. kuusinen, a civil war veteran 
and one of the leaders of the Finnish Communist Party who had become secretary 
to the Comintern executive committee, was appointed president; his ministers were 
chosen from Finnish communists in exile in the uSSR. A Finnish popular army 
was formed from Finns and karelians serving in the leningrad military region: 
by november 26, it was 13,405 men strong. the mutual assistance pact refused 
by Helsinki was signed, the USSR ceded 70,000 square kilometres of territory 
in eastern karelia to the Democratic Republic of Finland, and the legal Finnish 
government was denounced as bourgeois and therefore illegitimate. 
operations began on november 30. Finland appealed to the league of nations; 
the league’s Council called the Soviet and Finnish delegates to Geneva for talks on 
December 12. the Soviet government refused the invitation, sticking to its version 
of events and pointing out that they were not at war with the recognised government 
of the Democratic Republic of Finland, with which the uSSR had signed a pact of 
mutual assistance. the league voted to expel the uSSR on December 14 based on 
its attack on Finland and the violation of all signed agreements. The conlict, which 
affected the safety of Leningrad, was the irst since the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to 
adopt the civil war rhetoric of class solidarity and revolutionary expansion through 
the Red Army. Europe’s response was quick and stinging, although its military 
scale remained very limited. 
Conclusion
the uSSR found a way not to enter the Second World War in 1939, while waging 
war on its own account. A compelling argument can be made that the lack of 
reaction to the Soviet aggression of Poland and its demands on the Baltic states 
in autumn 1939 arose from the ambiguous situation created by the pact and from 
the splintered vision of conlict that was characteristic of the inter-war period. 
those who saw the war in terms of the need to resist two forms of totalitarianism 
in 1939 were few and far between. in Moscow, theoreticians and practitioners of 
international relations and law shared much in the way of reading and experience 
with their European counterparts when it came to observing modes of aggression 
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and conlict resolution. Political differences and ideological struggles across Europe 
did not hinder the formation of a transnational repertoire of types of discourse and 
practices understood and called on by the uSSR and other countries. on the other 
hand, Moscow did maintain speciic policies marked by revolutionary convictions: 
only when these were publicly held up to legitimise warfare did they meet with 
overtly hostile reactions, as shown by the Winter War. 
(traduit du français par Susan Pickford)
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